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Brocultre Requery 81-5160

18 September 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council


FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Succession in USSR

- 1. I had lunch with Ambassador Hartman who is on his way to Moscow today.
- 2. Do we have a good analysis of prospects for succession of Brezhnev in the Soviet Union? I am not merely talking about the people, their capabilities and their standing terms in which this discussion is usually conducted. I think there should be an analysis about how Malenkov, Khruschev, and Brezhnev attained power. What kind of following do the likely successors have, where do they have clout, where do they get their support, what are the critical forces, i.e., army, KGB, Politburo members, etc. Then, how the Politburo members and the possible candidates shape up in terms of these power factors.
- 3. Let's take a look at what we have on hand and see how adequate it is, consider who the front runners are and determine how we can gather and evaluate a comprehensive range of possibilities.



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